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Abstract
The correlation between social ties and political participation has been ev-
ident for some time, though very little attention is devoted to examining
the causal mechanisms producing this relationship. This paper moves the
literature in this direction by examining how an important feature of social
networks – levels of political expertise – affect the attitudes underlying in-
volvement. After outlining a model for explaining the relationship between
social expertise and involvement, analysis of the 2000 American National
Election Study shows that people who are in sophisticated social networks
are less likely to be ambivalent about candidates and more likely to feel effi-
cacious. This shows that social expertise supports participatory democracy
by helping demystify politics, thus building up the reservoir of attitudinal
resources necessary for involvement in politics.
1 Introduction
The willingness of citizens to engage in political action depends on whether
their social environments support such action, a point on which there is in-
creasingly strong evidence of causality (Nickerson 2008, Klofstad 2007b, Klof-
stad, McClurg & Rolfe Forthcoming, Lazer, Rubineau, Katz & Chetkovich
2007). Yet in spite of increasing interest in the social foundations of polit-
ical participation, a number of questions remain unanswered. First, under
what conditions should social ties facilitate participation and when should
we expect them to inhibit it? Second, is it possible for social networks to
encourage participation without undercutting other normatively desirable
behaviors, such as increased tolerance and deliberation (Mutz 2006)? This
paper addresses these questions with an in depth examination of how politi-
cal expertise embedded in egocentric social networks—hereafter referred to as
social expertise—affects the attitudinal foundations of political participation
(McClurg 2006a).
The principal argument is that social expertise is important for providing
cueing information, which contextualizes political decisions by helping re-
late their predispositions to the choices available to them and therefore more
likely to participate. Such information helps people become willing to make
judgments about candidates and to exhibit increased confidence in their per-
ceptions. In the case of elections, this implies that social expertise should
affect how clearly people are able to sort through political information, de-
fine how it relates to their own predispositions, and how confident they are
about politics. And, by influencing these attitudes, social expertise increases
the likelihood of participation. Data from the 2000 American National Elec-
tion Study (ANES) are used to explore the empirical implications of this
model. Specifically, the analysis shows that social expertise in voter network
is related to lower levels of candidate ambivalence, an increased willingness
to take positions on important political issues, and higher internal efficacy.
Importantly, these results hold even while controlling for what has been seen
as the principal source of political information in social networks—political
disagreement.
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2 Social Networks and Political Involvement
2.1 Social Networks, Communication, and Involvement
The last two decades has seen a resurgence of interest in social networks,
with particular attention paid to the consequences they hold for political
participation. Analysis of data sources specifically designed for studying
how social relations relate to political behavior establish correlations between
networks and participation (Leighley 1990, Knoke 1990, Kenny 1992, Lake &
Huckfeldt 1998, McClurg 2003). Though this implies a causal link between
the political character of social networks and political participation, evidence
in support of such an assumption has traditionally been lacking.
First, the direction of causality has been suspect on the grounds that
people can select their networks, making it possible that the political stimuli
reflect individual attitudes rather than influence them. As observational data
are generally not up to the task of tackling this criticism head on, progress
on this question has been slow. However, the use of innovative experimen-
tal (Nickerson 2008), quasi-experimental (Klofstad 2007b), and longitudinal
(Lazer et al. 2007) research designs put causal claims on much stronger foot-
ing. Both individual selection and social influence are undoubtedly at play
in networks (Lazer et al. 2007), suggesting that the earliest observational
studies overstate the strength of these relationships (Klofstad 2007a), yet
the evidence is clear—social influence occurs.
Second, there has been little theory or evidence about the causal mecha-
nism linking networks to involvement. While Kenny (1992) implies that net-
works produce participatory norms, McClurg (2003) emphasizes the impor-
tance of networks as a source of political information. Others have suggested
that social connections function as pathway for second-order effects stemming
from partisan mobilization campaigns (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993, McClurg
2004, Nickerson 2008). Although all—or none—of these mechanisms may
be at play, there has not been an attempt to provide an empirically verified
account of the social processes at work other than Mutz’s (2002a, 2002b) re-
search on disagreement. With stronger evidence supporting the assumption
that networks cause behavior, this issue can no longer be sensibly ignored if
we want to understand the social foundations of participation.
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2.2 Social Communication, Political Disagreement, and
Social Expertise
Tradition explanations of social network effects argue that they stem from
social communication. With respect to networks and involvement, this is
best illustrated by interest in political disagreement (Berelson, Lazarsfeld
& McPhee 1954, Huckfeldt, Johnson & Sprague 2004, Mutz 2006, McClurg
2006b). Debate here focuses on how cross-cutting political discussion—exposure
to people who challenge your political views—influences the propensity of
people to participate and how those effects arise. Although debate about the
substantive size of disagreement effects (McClurg 2006a, McClurg 2006b,
Sokhey 2007) and relative levels of disagreement (Mutz 2006, Huckfeldt,
Johnson & Sprague 2004) persists in the literature, the evidence un-mistakenly
shows that it makes participation less likely by inducing ambivalence and
stimulating conflict avoidance (Mutz 2002a, Mutz 2002b). Though this rep-
resents a promising start to a fuller understanding of the causal mechanisms
underling network effects on involvement, political disagreement cannot be
the sole explanation. Most clearly, the focus on disagreement explains con-
ditions under which participation is less likely but is ill-positioned to explain
the preponderance of evidence showing that networks also increase the like-
lihood of involvement.
One promising way to expand the study of causal mechanisms is to fo-
cus on social expertise, or relative levels of political sophistication in social
networks. People are not only good at identifying experts in their network,
but their informant’s level of knowledge is more important in determining
how often the dyad talks about politics than are whether political prefer-
ences are shared (Huckfeldt 2001). Building on this observation, there has
been some evidence provided that social expertise predicts political involve-
ment, even more strongly than does disagreement (McClurg 2006a, Lake &
Huckfeldt 1998).
Unlike the aforementioned studies of disagreement, there has been no
attempt to explain how social expertise influences participation. Does it in-
fluence involvement in the same way that social support does, by reducing
ambiguity? Or, does it operate through a different set of attitudes? Can
social expertise help explain when networks encourage participation, unlike
disagreement which principally shows when they do not? And perhaps most
importantly, does social expertise counteract what are perceived of as nega-
tive consequences of political disagreement for political participation?
3
3 Social Expertise and the Foundations of Po-
litical Involvement
Answers to these questions are derived by focusing on how social expertise
helps contextualize politics and thereby makes involvement more likely. This
involves two assumptions. One is that network effects arise from how they
influence the political information available to people. Although information
can come from a variety of other sources, the implication is that variation
in social networks influences both exposure to and interpretation of political
information(McClurg 2003). The second assumption is that networks effects
flow from how they shape the attitudes that underlie political behavior. This
is equivalent to saying that social influence depends on whether it is assimi-
lated by individuals. It also has the more practical consequence of focusing
attention on how perceptions of the political context changes in response to
networks, rather than simply on how people perceive their networks.1
Together these assumptions imply that network effects arise from a pro-
cess of political learning. People who are embedded in qualitatively different
networks should be exposed to different types of information and therefore
have different views about candidates and issues. The question then becomes
how social expertise affects learning in a way that makes people more or less
likely to become involved. In some sense, this is similar to the manner in
which arguments about political disagreement are developed, with people
who experience social disagreement becoming more ambivalent about pol-
itics. But social expertise is a different in the sense that people are not
simply hearing different sides of an issue, but are hearing a different type of
information with potentially different consequences.
3.1 Social Expertise as an Information Source
Zaller’s (1992) discussion of media information provides a good starting point
for categorizing information into two types: 1) persuasive messages or 2) cue-
ing messages. The former refers to arguments for and against specific points
of view, while the latter is described as information that “enable[s] citizens
to perceive relationships between the persuasive messages they receive and
1In this sense, this follows the approach used by Mutz (2006) to understand political
involvement rather than the efforts of Huckfeldt and his collaborators (2004) to explain
the persistence of disagreement.
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their political predispositions, which in turn permits them to respond criti-
cally to the persuasive messages” (Zaller 1992, p. 42). I consider both types
in turn here.
General political expertise a proxy for individual levels of political in-
formation (Carpini & Keeter 1996), meaning that networks rich in political
expertise should be deep sources of political information. Thus, a network
with political experts is likely to provide access to many pieces of factual
information (e.g., how to register to vote) as well as varying arguments for
and against political positions. Socially expert networks undoubtedly serve
as good sources of persuasive information that is either a direct subsidy of
participation or useful for sorting through candidates and issues.
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to expect that this is not the main
reason they influence involvement. Unlike political disagreement, social ex-
pertise does not suggest anything about the bias of these messages. A net-
work high in social expertise could be polarized along partisan lines just as
it could be homogeneous. From a more theoretical perspective, people who
consult their networks for persuasive information are doing so in order to
reduce the costs associated with political behavior (Downs 1957). Someone
engaged in such rent-seeking behavior is unlikely to be so moved by the infor-
mation that they are spurred to participate, particularly in higher cost forms
of involvement such as campaign work or displaying paraphernalia. Finally,
political psychology research shows that these kinds of messages are rarely
internalized. Simply put, consultation with political experts is unlikely to
increase your own political expertise significantly; all of the same reasons
you were not a political expert in the first place still apply to what you do
with the information received from the network.2
The more important consequences of social expertise, then, likely stem
from exposure to cueing messages/information (McClurg 2006a). Another
way of saying this is that social expertise influences the quantity of political
information available in a network, but that its effects are more likely to em-
anate from how it shapes the quality of that information. If social expertise
in fact provides this kind of information, it should shape how people under-
stand politics rather than what they know about it. In other words, social
expertise is important for influencing how people make sense of politics, a
2On this point, Sohkey and McClurg (n.d.) find little evidence that people make better
decisions in expert networks, let alone for how it influences their underlying attitudes
about candidates and policies.
5
Figure 1: A Learning Model of Social Network Effects on Involvement
Social Expertise //
++VVVV
VVVVV
VVVVV
VVVVV
Confidence
++VVVV
VVVV
VVVV
VVVV
VV
Ambivalence // Political Involvement
Political Disagreement
33hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh
//// Conflict Avoidance
44hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh
similar role to political expertise in Zaller’s (1992) original model.
This kind of argument is a distinct departure from studies that focus on
opinion leadership and information shortcuts for explaining social network
effects (Downs 1957). However, it is very similar to how we understand cam-
paign and media effects. For example, Samuel Popkin (1994) describes a
similar process in his discussion of how people go “beyond data” in elections
in order to make vote choices. His argument is that people have consider-
able gaps in their political information and lots of uncertainty about how
to assemble that information, making campaigns particularly important for
helping people connect the dots in a way that makes them support their
candidate. Similarly, to the extent that social networks provide context for
relating political information to their predispositions, affecting how sharply
people see the electoral context. This in turn should increase the benefits of
participation
3.2 Social Expertise and the Foundations for Political
Action
If this is true, what are the observable implications? I argue that social
expertise effects manifest themselves in two ways—through attitudinal am-
bivalence and confidence in their understanding of politics. These pathways
are graphically represented in Figure 1, along with the links connecting polit-
ical disagreement to involvement for the purpose of showing how this research
differs from earlier studies of disagreement.
Foremost among the consequences of social expertise is that it should
reduce ambivalence by helping people recognize differences between candi-
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dates and which choice is consistent with their predispositions. As Zaller
argues, people who cannot effectively sort through persuasive information in
order to reject dissonant arguments are likely to become more ambivalent.
And, cueing information is useful for engaging in this rejection-acceptance
process. As this kind of ambivalence increases, people should be less likely to
engage in multiple forms of political involvement because they will be more
uncertain about which side to support. Altogether this means that social
expertise—unlike political disagreement—should reduce ambivalence instead
of increase it. Indirect evidence exists for this point in McClurg’s (2006a)
demonstration that social expertise is related to vote decisions that come
earlier in an election
Social expertise also does more than influence a person’s ambivalence. As
(McClurg 2006a, p. 740) writes, “. . . sophisticated political networks provide
environments that support clearer and more contextualized communication
of political information.” As people are better able to sort through issues
and see increased relevance to themselves, we would expect that they would
be more likely to take stands on a wider variety of issues and to attribute
positions to candidates as well. In other words, social expertise can help
people take their political information and organize it into dominant partisan
and issue categories. This in turn implies that people should feel as though
they have a better understanding of politics. In the vernacular of social
psychology, discussing politics with knowledgeable people may increase a
person’s internal efficacy, or their view on how capable they are of involving
themselves in politics. Any give and take between a person and someone they
consider to be knowledgeable potentially improves that person’s confidence
in their opinions and understanding. If their confidence rises, it then stands
to reason that they would feel a greater ability to participate efficaciously.
Both of these effects increase the chances of involvement by lowering the
costs and clarifying the benefits of political activity ranging from voting to
working on campaigns. A prerequisite for political involvement—be it in a
campaign or on an issue—is a willingness to assess different sides of the issue
(related to ambivalence and confidence), the perception of meaningful differ-
ences between the difference sides (related to ambivalence), and feeling that
you understand what is going on well enough to meaningfully participate (re-
lated to confidence). Although other factors undoubtedly influence involve-
ment—e.g., individual resources (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995)—this
should not undercut the importance of network effects.
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4 Data
The 2000 American National Election Study (ANES) provide data for test-
ing these hypotheses. This long-running survey has information on a random
sample of Americans through both pre and post election interviews. Unlike
most of its predecessors, the 2000 edition of the ANES included a battery of
questions aimed at measuring characteristics of its respondent’s social net-
works. Each respondent was asked to identify as many as four people with
whom they discussed “important matters.”3 Follow-up questions gaged each
respondent’s perceptions of these discussants, including whom they voted for
in the presidential election and how knowledgeable they are about politics.
As the ANES traditionally includes questions on a wide variety of political
attitudes, these data appropriate for examining how social networks are re-
lated to the attitudinal foundations of political involvement. The remainder
of this section discusses the measurement of these variables.
4.1 Network Measures
The principal independent variable in the analyses below is social expertise,
or the level of political sophistication contained in interpersonal networks.
Ideally, this measure would be derived by directly measuring how much po-
litical knowledge is held by each discussant. As there are no discussant
interviews in the 2000 ANES, it is instead based on the respondents percep-
tion of whether each discussant knows a lot, a little, or quite a bit about
politics. Although these answers likely include perceptual errors, previous
research shows that actual discussant knowledge is the strongest predictor of
the respondent’s perceptions (Huckfeldt 2001).
Using these replies, social expertise is measured as the average level of
political sophistication in the network. Respondents who do not name any
discussants receive a zero on this measure as they had no access to political
experts.4 There are roughly 1500 usable replies ranging from zero to two,
3Out of 1807 total interviews, 1551 respondents provided answers to the network ques-
tions. The average respondent identified 1.8 discussants, with 399 saying they had no
discussants.
4An extensive analysis by McClurg (2006a) shows that social expertise effects are robust
to multiple specifications for how to treat people that name no discussants. Rather than
limit the analysis only to respondents who have networks, I therefore measure them as
receiving no information from the network.
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indicating networks with no social expertise or full of people knowledge about
politics, respectively. The average level of expertise in a network is .93 with
a standard deviation of .71, with the averages and standard deviations being
fairly constant across all networks with at least one person in them.
Given the amount of attention devoted to political disagreement in pre-
vious research and the need to distinguish the effects of social expertise, it is
important to also measure levels of social support in the network. Although
there is some debate about the best way to conceptualize and measure dis-
agreement (Huckfeldt, Johnson & Sprague 2004, Mutz 2006), the data leave
little choice in this manner. I first measure disagreement in each discussion
dyad by determining whether the respondent’s reported vote choice is the
same as her perception of the discussant’s vote choice, with any difference
indicating a lack of agreement. I then measure the proportion of the respon-
dent’s dyads that do not share the respondent’s vote choice. Though these
measure were gathered in post-election interviews and may overstate levels
of disagreement, it is a widely used and facially valid measure of how likely
it is that a network is politically at odds with the respondent.
There are also nearly 1500 usable replies to this question.5 The average is
33% and a standard deviation of 40% and the vast majority of the networks
exhibiting either full agreement(52%) or complete disagreement (19%). For
networks with more than one person, there is not significant variation in this
measure based on the size of the network. Networks with only one identified
discussant (n=291) are equally as likely to contain disagreement as they are
agreement, with an average of 51% on this measure.
4.2 Dependent Variables
Testing the hypotheses requires two different dependent variables, one mea-
suring ambivalence and another that measures confidence. Following the
practice suggested by Lavine (2001), I combine a respondent’s likes and dis-
likes about each candidate to create ambivalence measures. If P represents
positive and N represents negative reactions to candidates, ambivalence is
5Respondents who do not identify networks again receive a score of zero, indicating
that they experience no disagreement. It is also true that they experience no agreement
either, but as noted above the key variation here is the absence, rather than the presence,
of support.
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shown in in Equation (1) below.
P +N
2
− | P −N | (1)
The first component of this equation represents the intensity of a respondent’s
reaction to the candidates, while the second component represents polarity
(Lavine 2001, p. 919). This measure can be expanded to measure general
ambivalence toward the candidates by include a P and N term for each
candidate. The formula for the 2000 presidential election is represented by
Equation (2).
PGore +NGore + PBush +NBush
2
− [| PGore −NGore | + | PBush −NBush |] (2)
When examining ambivalence toward a single candidate (Equation 1), this
measure ranges from -2.5 to 5; when applied to two candidates (Equation 2),
it can range from -7.5 to 5. For both versions of the measure, positive values
suggest higher levels of ambivalence. In the two-candidate measure, the main
differences is that a negative value represents a positive and polarized set of
attitudes. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for ambivalence and the
other dependent variables.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
Measure Mean Std. Dev. Range N
Ambivalence
Gore -0.51 1.12 -2.5,5 1787
Bush -0.58 1.06 -2.5,5 1777
Combined -2.09 2.10 -7.5,4 1767
Internal Efficacy 0.48 0.24 0,1 1534
The second dependent variable is a standard measure of internal efficacy,
which I use to gage how much confidence a respondent has in her ability to
effectively participate in politics. The measure is a scale based on questions
that ask respondents how informed about, qualified for, and understanding
they are about politics (Niemi, Craig & Mattei 1991, Craig, Niemi & Silver
1990, Craig & Maggiotto 1982). Earlier research confirms the validity of this
scale, which is measured here on a zero to one interval, and how it differs from
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the related concepts of external efficacy and political trust. In the case of
the 2000 data, the internal efficacy measure has a mean 0.47 and a standard
deviation of 0.24.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Social Expertise and Candidate Ambivalence
A suitable starting point for the analysis is candidate ambivalence. Not
only is there indirect evidence that social expertise influences how much
ambivalence people have (McClurg 2006a), but this is a pivotal variable for
understanding the normative effects of networks. To the extent that networks
induce ambivalence, they help potential voters see different sides of political
issues and make them less likely to participate. To the extent that social
expertise dilutes the negative effect of disagreement, it would suggest that
networks do not necessarily need to involve as much of a trade off between
deliberation and participation.
Table 2 shows the results from three regression models that investigate
the effect of social expertise, political disagreement, and control variables
on the ambivalence measured discussed in the previous section. Among the
controls are standard demographic controls for gender, race, age, and educa-
tion. Political variables include 4-point measures of partisan and ideological
strength. The respondent’s response to ten separate political knowledge ques-
tions and post-election report of how closely they followed the campaign are
also included.
Each of these models significantly predicts variance in candidate ambiva-
lence over the null model. When the ambivalence toward the candidates is
modeled separately, the model predicts roughly 10% of the variance in the
dependent variable with small changes improvements in the root mean square
error (MSE) over the original standard deviation (on the magnitude of .06
units). Conversely, the model does a much better job of predicting overall
ambivalence with an adjusted R2 of .20 and a root MSE .2 units lower than
the original standard deviation. These differences are understandable in light
of the theoretical framework. If social expertise is important for providing
cueing information rather than persuasive information, then there should not
be a strong partisan bias in its impact on ambivalence and it should perhaps
be more important for influencing overall attitudes toward politics.
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Table 2: OLS Regression Model of Candidate Ambivalence in 2000 ANES
Combined Gore Bush
β∗ s.e. β∗ s.e. β∗ s.e.
Network Knowledge -0.44 0.10** -0.09 0.05# -0.11 0.05*
Network Disagreement 0.32 0.15* 0.22 0.08* 0.10 0.08
Education 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.02** 0.07 0.02**
Knowledge -0.10 0.03** 0.003 0.02 -0.02 0.02
Distinctiveness -0.33 0.05** -0.08 0.03** -0.16 0.03**
Partisan Strength -0.31 0.06** -0.16 0.03** -0.09 0.03**
Ideological Strength -0.26 0.07** -0.10 0.04* -0.12 0.04**
Followed Election -0.10 0.08 -0.07 0.04# -0.03 0.04
White -0.03 0.15 0.07 0.08 -0.02 0.07
Female -0.30 0.12* -0.16 0.06* -0.18 0.06**
Age -0.01 0.004** -0.01 0.002** -0.01 0.002**
Constant 0.43 0.26 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.14
N 1335 1348 1343
Adj. R2 0.20 0.10 0.11
Root MSE 1.89 1.04 1.00
F 29.94** 14.55** 15.59***
# <p.10,*p<.05, **p<.01 all two-tailed tests.
Directly pertinent to this paper the results provide strong evidence for the
hypothesis that social expertise should reduce ambivalence. In the model of
combined ambivalence, every unit increase in network sophistication reduces
ambivalence by .45 units. Thus someone who has a network full of political
experts will have an overall ambivalence score than is almost one whole point
lower than someone who has no access to expertise. This compares favorably
to the effect of other variables across their range, such as political knowledge
and ideological strength.
As anticipated political disagreement in networks increases ambivalence.
But importantly, the effect is smaller than the effect of expertise. Mov-
ing across the entire disagreement scale—from zero to one—increases am-
bivalence by 0.32 units, an effect that is roughly one-third the impact of
disagreement. Not only is this consistent with earlier evidence that social
expertise is more important for explaining participation than disagreement
(McClurg 2006a), but it implies that social expertise can more than balance
the negative impact of disagreement on participation. And while the corre-
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lation between these two measures is not extraordinarily strong, people who
experience disagreement on average have networks that are higher in social
expertise (r = .33).
The other two models provide additional—if qualified—support for the
hypothesis. In both cases, network sophistication is statistically significant.
If we use two-tailed tests, as does Table 1, the effect is significant at the
.10 level for ambivalence about Al Gore but is significant at the .05 level for
George Bush. Interestingly, network disagreement is a substantively strong
and statistically precise predictor of ambivalence toward Gore but not Bush.
This implies that attitudes toward the incumbent party candidate Gore were
more substantially influenced by disagreement and those toward the less fa-
miliar candidate Bush were more strongly related to expertise. Again, this is
somewhat understandable in light of the theory as cueing information should
be more important for understanding a new object of evaluation than one
that people likely had more information on. Nevertheless, such an argument
requires further testing and is not entirely consistent with the theoretical
model.
5.2 Effects of Social Expertise on Confidence
A key component of the argument offered in this paper is that cueing in-
formation should help people better understand politics, thus leading them
to feel more confident. Toward this end, the next step in the analysis is to
analyze how capable people feel of participating in politics. There are two
different components to these feeling—internal and external efficacy (Niemi,
Craig & Mattei 1991). The first refers to how capable a person feels of their
ability to participate, while the second refers to whether the person sees sys-
temic factors as being roadblocks. Based on the hypotheses offered above,
this section focuses on internal efficacy.
Table 3 reports the results of an OLS regression model of internal effi-
cacy. This model is essentially the same set of variables as used in Table
2, though the respondent’s views on how distinct they see the candidates
is dropped as a control variable since it is not a clear factor in producing
internal efficacy. As above, the model does a good job of predicting variation
in internal efficacy with an adjusted R2 of 36%, a 25% reduction in the root
MSE, and a statistically significant test against the null model. Addition-
ally, all of the variables significantly predict variation with the exception of
network disagreement, partisan strength, and age. Considering that many
13
of the underlying cognitive and peronanality structures that may produce
internal efficacy are not controlled here, this is an impressive performance.
Most central to this paper, the results support the hypothesis that social
expertise makes people more confident. Each unit increase in network knowl-
edge produces a statistically significant .03 unit increase in internal efficacy.
As the dependent variable is on a 0-1 scale, this can be interpreted as a 3%
increase in internal efficacy. Although this does not seem very strong at first
blush, the effect is comparable to other variables in the model. For example,
having a network full of political sophisticates has an effect on part with mov-
ing from being a moderate to a weak liberal or conservative. Though other
variables remain more important, particularly personal political knowledge
and interest, the bottom line remains that people exposed to social expertise
exhibit higher levels of confidence.
Table 3: OLS Model of Internal Efficacy in 2000 ANES
Internal Efficacy
β∗ s.e.
Network Knowledge 0.03 0.01*
Network Disagreement -0.02 0.02
Education 0.02 0.004**
Knowledge 0.03 0.003**
Partisan Strength 0.00 0.01
Ideological Strength 0.02 0.01
Political Interest 0.08 0.01**
White -0.06 0.02**
Female -0.08 0.01**
Age -0.00 0.00
Constant 0.27 0.03**
N 1357
Adj. R2 0.36
Root MSE 0.19
F 61.03**
# <p.10,*p<.05, **p<.01 all two-tailed tests.
One sensible objection to the results in Table 3 would be that the direction
of causality may work in the other direction. Unlike candidate ambivalence,
which is a temporary response to a specific election and therefore less likely
to structure the types of networks measured here (Klofstad, McClurg & Rolfe
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Forthcoming), internal efficacy is a more stable attitude that is less about the
specific choices than about the individual. Consequently, it is quite possible
that people who have high levels of internal efficacy are more likely to feel
confident disagreeing with people in their network and having conversations
with political experts. To the extent that this is true, it could produce
endogeneity or selection bias in these results.
Although a full exploration of causality is not possible here, it is impor-
tant to tackle this question as directly as possible. Toward that end, I use a
simultaneous equation model estimated with two-stage least squares to de-
termine the effect of social expertise on internal efficacy. To do this, it is
necessary to have exogenous variables that uniquely explain variance in each
dependent variable. For internal efficacy, I use two batteries that measure a
respondent’s need to evaluate and need for cognition. The first of these is
based on two questions that ask a respondent to report on how opinionated
she is on issues and relative to other people. The need for cognition battery
is based on two questions that ask respondents whether they like thinking
and if they prefer complex problems to simple ones. For both batteries, the
questions were coded to be on a zero to one scale and then the respondent’s
answers were averaged across the two questions. Although these questions
are some degree correlated with both social expertise (r = .25) and internal
efficacy (r = .38), the specification is based on the assumption that inter-
nal efficacy is more strongly related to cognitive structure than are network
choices in such a way that the effects on expertise are best understood as
being filtered through efficacy.
To predict network knowledge, I use two exogneous variables in the aver-
age level of political talk in the network and the percentage of the network
is male. While internal efficacy is empirically correlated with these variables
(r = .37 and r = .16, respectively), there is again theoretical justification
for the order of effects. First, with respect to political talk the specifica-
tion is based on the assumption that discussion is imposed upon people to a
greater extent than they can control it. Second, a long standing finding in
network studies is that men are perceived as being more politically expert
than women, even when they are not (Huckfeldt & Sprague 1995). There is
no particular reason, conversely, to believe that the gender bias of a person’s
network depends more strongly on their efficacy.
Estimates of this simultaneous equation model are reported in Table 4.
Prior to discussing them it is worth pointing out that these are robust to
relaxing the specification assumptions. In a series of results not shown here,
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Table 4: Simultaneous Equation Model of Internal Efficacy and Social Ex-
pertise in 2000 ANES
Internal Efficacy Network Knowledge
β∗ s.e. β∗ s.e.
Endogenous Variables
Internal Efficacy 0.63 0.24**
Network Knowledge 0.12 0.03**
Exogenous Variables
Need for Cognition 0.13 0.02**
Need to Evaluate 0.18 0.03**
% Male in Network 0.05 0.02**
Political Talk 0.28 0.03**
Control Variables
Network Disagreement -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.04
Education 0.01 0.004** 0.02 0.012
Knowledge 0.03 0.003** -0.01 0.01
Partisan Strength 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02
Ideological Strength -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
Political Interest 0.07 0.01** -0.04 0.03
White -0.04 0.02** 0.08 0.04*
Female -0.08 0.01** 0.16 0.04**
Age 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Constant -0.02 0.04 0.17 0.10
N 1008 100
R2 0.42 0.14
Root MSE 0.18 0.47
F 67.63** 18.88**
# <p.10,*p<.05, **p<.01 all two-tailed tests.
exogenous variables were placed in what I have labeled as the control vari-
able category. In every case, the evidence remains consistent with the basic
hypothesis that expertise increases efficacy.6
Although both of the exogenous predictors of internal efficacy are statisti-
cally significant at the .01 level, the overall performance of this model is only
6It is also worth noting that these results are not weighted, as are those in Tables 2
and 3.
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marginally different than in the OLS model. Nevertheless, these estimates
satisfy the exogeneity requirements. Interestingly, the effect of social exper-
tise is significantly larger than previously—rising to 0.14 from 0.02. Again,
this is evidence in favor of the central arguments in this paper even though
it is clear that there are significant feedback effects from internal efficacy to
network knowledge. Keeping in mind that these findings should be subject
to additional investigation with data more capable of establishing causality,
the overall thrust of this evidence is to suggest that social expertise may in
part be sought out by people high in internal efficacy, but it still has the
effect of increasing their political confidence.
6 Discussion
Social expertise plays a fundamental role in explaining how networks can fa-
cilitate involvement in politics. First, it can help counteract increases in am-
bivalence experienced from disagreement in the networks. This implies that
in those situations where disagreement and expertise exist side-by-side in net-
works, that there is potential for people to gain from their informal delibera-
tion while also increasing their reasons for participating. While neither factor
is probably determinative of involvement by itself, it does affect whether peo-
ple decide to take personal resources and apply them to politics. In this way,
social networks can affect the marginal rates of participation of people who
are both resource poor and resource rich (McClurg 2003, Klofstad 2007a).
However, social expertise does not simply insulate potential voters from
disagreeable opinions that make them less likely to participate. If we were
to imagine a situation in which there is very little disagreement, significant
variability would remain in people’s attitudes about the candidates because
of other factors. To the extent that having larger social networks creates op-
portunities to talk politics more frequently with people that can supplement
a person’s information, they can have a positive effect on participation simply
by reducing this ambivalence. In this way, the evidence in this paper helps
explain the positive correlations that are the foundation of this literature.
There are also impressive consequences of social expertise on internal
efficacy. Even though we should reserve some judgment about the size of
this effect without further investigation, the fact that this relationship holds
up in a simultaneous equation framework with minimal exogenous variables
suggests that there is an important relationship at work here. And from
17
the perspective of the theoretical framework, it is particularly important ev-
idence for suggesting that social expertise is important for helping people
understand politics rather than simply acting as an additional source of per-
suasive and factual information.
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